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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants. 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
and Appellant, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association being 
also Respondent. 
Appellant, Jack C. Daniels (hereinafter "Daniels"), 
wishes to correct assertions in the Brief of Respondent, Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter Deseret), in its 
Statement of the Case section and again in its Statement of Facts 
section that are not supported by the record. 
First, this action is not "a third-party action 
instituted by Daniels" as alleged at page 1 of Respondent's Brief, 
but is, as indicated in appellant's original brief an action 
initially brought by the owner of the subject property, plaintiff 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 86-0466 
Category No. 13.b 
herein, CEN Corporation, to which action Deseret was later added 
as an additional essential party on motion of Daniels. 
At page 3 of Respondent's Brief it is noted: 
"On June 23, 1982, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin 
entered an order denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and decreeing that Daniels' lien was not 
cancelled or vacated . . . Daniels never objected to 
Judge Dee's Order Discharging Claims nor did he attack 
the sufficiency of the sureties on the $75,000.00 bond." 
It is submitted a fortiori that when a lien is held not 
to have been replaced, that any bond submitted as a proposed 
substitute therefor becomes null and void, and even though Judge 
Baldwin's Order ordering that the lien not be vacated did not 
expressly overrule Judge Dee's Order originally granted on ex 
parte motion of plaintiff, CEN Corporation, it had that obvious 
and full effect, thus relieving Daniels of any need to take 
exception to sureties or further move to discharge or reverse 
Judge Dee's Order. 
Moreover, paragraphs 17 and 18 of Deseret's Statement of 
Facts on page 7 are misleading. Paragraph 17 says: 
" . . . Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin entered an 
order vacating and cancelling any lis pendens filed in 
connection with the Project, but not disturbing Judge 
Dee's Order Discharging Daniels' lien." (Emphasis 
added.) 
A copy of Judge Baldwin's Order (and the orders amended 
by it) are attached as an Addendum to this brief, and it will be 
noted there is no reference whatever in Judge Baldwin's Order 
asserting that Judge Dee's Order discharging the lien is not 
disturbed. The Order does not refer to the lien, but that was an 
oversight and was corrected by the Amended Order referred to in 
paragraph 18 which says: 
"On February 18f 1983, Judge Baldwin entered an 
Amended Order ordering that Daniels1 'Lien not cancelled 
or vacated.•" 
Once again it is submitted that if a lien is not canceled or 
vacated, a prior ex parte order discharging said lien cannot also 
remain in effect and is thereby reversed. It is self-evident that 
a court cannot nullify a lien by ex parte order, nor for that 
matter can it nullify a lis pendens (ex parte or otherwise) 
referring to the action in which the lien is being foreclosed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CALLING OF DANIELS BACK TO THE JOBSITE 
DECEMBER 1, 1981, RAISES ISSUES OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE DISPOSED 
OF BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In rebuttal to Point I of Deseret's Argument: If we 
read their brief correctly they seem to argue that Section 38-1-3, 
Utah Code Annotated, is really three lien statutes in one. One is 
for contractors and subcontractors, one for architects and 
engineers, and one for miners or oil drillers. In making this 
tortured argument Deseret suggests that only architects can 
recover for estimates of costs or preparing maps or specifications 
or drawings, etc., and that the other two classifications must 
confer benefits in the way of value added to the property in order 
to obtain a lienable interest. Such an argument fails for two 
reasons: First, it ignores the clear preamble language of the 
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section of the code itself; and second, it makes an artificial 
distinction between making estimates and lining up potential 
workmen from the actual "performing of repairs." 
As noted in Daniels' original brief at page 10, Section 
38-1-3 begins: 
"Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing any materials used 
in the construction, alteration, or improvement . . . " 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is submitted that both miners and architects, 
contractors, subcontractors, engineers and artisans fit into the 
general class of "all persons" noted above, and "any services" 
also is broad enough to include the making of estimates, preparing 
maps, specifications, drawings, etc. Furthermore, as originally 
argued in appellant's brief, to say that an architect can recover 
for making estimates and that a general contractor cannot is to 
make an unwarranted distinction between the general work being 
performed by both professions in connection with any construction 
or mining project. In short, to argue that Daniels' work on 
December 1 was somehow of a different variety and kind than what 
he had been doing during the entire period of construction (August 
1980 through July 1981) is a distinction of art rather than fact 
and does not appear in, nor is it supported by, any of the 
language of the statute in question. 
Deseret concedes at page 13: 
"If he [Daniels] or his subcontractors had 
actually performed the repairs, there may well have 
-4-
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been a question of fact as to whether that work was 
'substantial.111 (Emphasis added.) 
Again, the undersigned submit that no contractor, 
architect, miner or oil driller repairs or commences initial 
construction without first doing the preliminary estimates, and 
that such conduct constitutes an integral part of the work product 
to which the lien statute relates, and that this concession of 
Deseret constitutes an admission that an issue of fact really 
exists here to be determined by a trial court. 
An additional reason why Deseret1s argument must fail 
is that the quoted statute used "improvement," giving rise to 
Deseret's "value conferred" notion in the alternative not 
cumulative: " . . . any services . . . used in the construction, 
alteration o£ improvement . . . " (Emphasis added.) That clear 
language negates any universal requisite adding of value as pre-
condition to right of lien. 
None of the cases cited in Point I by Deseret make such 
distinction separating the making of estimates from the doing of 
actual repairs or doing of actual construction. Indeed, the 
distinction is of the making of Deseret alone. 
While it may be that Deseret has come to that conclusion 
by inference from the Order of Judge Fishier from which this 
appeal is taken, that there must have been some benefit conferred 
on the property by Daniels before he has the right to a lien based 
upon work done on December 1, 1981, it is that very error which 
brings this appeal before this court. 
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As to the "substantiality" of Daniels1 work on December 
1, 1981, Deseret seems to concede that it was not in the nature of 
cleaning up, which all parties agree is not what is at issue here. 
The simple truth of the matter is that plaintiff, CEN Corporation, 
through its representative, called Daniels back onto the job on 
December 1 after the pipes had broken, either under the guise that 
there had been a breach of warranty or that it was a matter of 
defective construction, and claiming thereby that it was Daniels1 
responsibility to make the repairs as he had not, according to 
plaintiff, CEN Corporation, completed his job. After realizing 
that such action extended the lien period, plaintiff quickly 
attempted to rescind, hoping thereby to undo what it had already 
done. They can't have it both ways. They can't claim the repairs 
are the responsibility of Daniels and then claim his work doesn't 
relate to the original contract. Inasmuch as what Daniels was 
asked to do directly relates to the original contract, there 
remains then an issue of fact as to how substantial it was. 
Deseret cannot succeed by attempting to bifurcate the kinds of 
work by claiming estimates and costs are not available to 
contractors—only architects—since the statute does not so 
provide, nor does the case law so hold. 
Moreover, consistent with the view that this need to 
come and do the repair work was what activated the plaintiff, CEN 
Corporation, we submit as a part of the Addendum to this brief the 
pleadings in a companion case filed by CEN Corporation in Salt 
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Lake County Division of the Third District Court that sought to 
recover damages from appellant Daniels for the bursting of the 
pipes. So, the issue of fact yet to be determined by the lower 
court upon reversal by this court runs to that very basic 
question: Did the plaintiff, by calling Daniels back to the 
project, extend his lien rights, or did they timely rescind such 
recall, get third parties to do the repair and elect to sue in a 
neighboring jurisdiction for damages caused by said repairs? 
Again plaintiff and Deseret are trying to have it both ways, but 
at the very least, as originally argued by the undersigned, these 
are issues of fact that must be submitted to a trier of fact and 
cannot be disposed of by summary judgment. 
POINT II: RESPONDENT, DESERET, ACQUIRED ITS INTEREST 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE RECORDING OF PLAINTIFF'S MECHANIC'S LIEN AND 
TAKES SUBJECT THERETO (SECTION 57-3-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953). 
A. RECORDING OF LIEN AS NOTICE. 
Deseret acquired its interest in the property by trust 
deed approximately one month after the recording of plaintiff's 
Notice of Lien and, pursuant to the provisions of Section 57-3-2, 
takes subject to whatever plaintiff is entitled to prove under 
said Notice of Lien. 
In its Brief of Respondent Deseret attempts to cir-
cumvent this conclusion by asserting at page 24: 
" . . . the recording act has no application to the Utah 
Mechanic's Lien Act." 
-7-
That statement is totally unsupported in the brief. Even Deseret 
doesn't seem to take it seriously as on page 25 they state: 
"Deseret Federal submits that the requirement that a 
Notice of Lien be timely filed is designed to protect 
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees." (Emphasis 
added.) 
What Deseret does assert is that the rights of Daniels 
under the mechanic's lien statute are extended beyond the 
recording act. Deseret asserts that Daniels' rights accrue from 
the time that the first work was done on the premises, not from 
the time of the recording of the mechanic's lien. We have no 
reluctance in accepting that extension of benefits, but the fact 
remains that as far as Deseret is concerned it had notice of 
Daniels' claims approximately one month prior to the time it 
acquired its interest in the property. The fact that Daniels' 
rights are actually more extensive than that does not benefit 
Deseret. 
The whole purpose of requiring a mechanic's lien to be 
filed in the office of the County Recorder is to give notice of 
said claim to persons dealing with the property, and that in 
furtherance of the purposes of the recording act. The fact that a 
mechanic's lienholder has benefits which extend beyond the 
recording date does not detract from the value of the recording in 
giving notice. 
What Deseret is apparently attempting to achieve by its 
erroneous, unsupported assertion that the recording act does not 
apply to mechanic's liens is to set the stage for its "side deal" 
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argument on page 29 of its brief. There it is argued that since 
the rights of one supplying labor or materials to real estate 
arise from the time the work is commenced, that such a person 
could make a "side deal" with the owner after the work commences 
but prior to the time that the lien is required to be filed, and 
that a third party dealing with the owner would not be able to 
protect himself against such side deals. 
There are a number of fallacies of that argument. First 
of all, it does not present the situation we are dealing with 
here. Deseret did not acquire its interest prior to the recording 
by Daniels of his mechanic's lien, but rather afterwards. 
Whatever arguments there may be against "unrecorded side deals," 
are not applicable to Deseret, who took with full notice of 
Daniels' claim, and that would seem to be dispositive of that 
argument for the purpose of this case. 
Furthermore, when a lender or subsequent purchaser deals 
with property upon which improvements have recently been erected, 
there is always the problem of unrecorded mechanic's liens claims 
to be dealt with. This is done by making inquiry as to dates of 
completion, obtaining lien waivers, and of course lender's title 
insurance plays an important role in this area. Had Deseret 
acquired its interest in the property before Daniels had recorded 
his lien, there might be a basis for arguing that Deseret should 
not be bound by the estoppel, unless of course it took its 
interest with actual knowledge. 
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For Daniels to prevail in this action it is not 
necessary for the court to rule that Daniels' rights run 
uninterruped from the first day of work, on and on as extended by 
"side deals" between the owner and the laborer notwithstanding the 
intervening rights of truly innocent grantees or mortgagees. Each 
of those situations can, and should, be dealt with as it arises. 
To rule that a person who takes an interest in property after the 
recording of a mechanic's lien takes subject to whatever can be 
shown for that lien, will hurt no one. Those choosing to deal 
with the property after knowing of such a lien can protect 
themselves through escrow (or the like) or can assume the risk if 
they choose to do so that the lien may be defeated on the merits, 
but they certainly should not be allowed to entirely ignore the 
recorded notice. Such a holding will only help those intent on 
doing mischief. Legitimate businessmen will find adequate 
protection in the notice afforded by the recorded lien. 
B. DESERET WAS NOT LED INTO A TRAP. 
Deseret seems to want to suggest that Daniels somehow 
led Deseret into a trap. At page 33, Deseret makes the assertion 
that: 
"In essence, Daniels did everything necessary to induce 
Deseret Federal into lending money to the owner." 
There is absolutely no basis for that assertion. Daniels was told 
that if he would not record his mechanic's lien, CEN Corporation 
would obtain a loan and pay him off. They did not do that. They 
neither obtained the loan, nor did they pay him off as of the time 
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that he recorded his mechanic's lien. Deseret did not refinance 
the property until nearly one month after the recording of the 
mechanic's lien. The fact that the owners of the property 
misrepresented to Daniels that they were going to refinance the 
property and pay him is no basis for the assertion that he was 
trying to mislead or "dupe" anybody. Had the owners received 
their refinancing and paid Daniels, there would have been no lien 
recorded. If Deseret had provided financing to the owner after 
the 100 days and before the lien was recorded, and had the owner 
then fraudulently failed to pay Daniels, there might be some basis 
for Deseret to complain. However, Deseret did the financing with 
the full knowledge that Jack Daniels had not been paid and that he 
asserted a claim against the property, and, having assumed that 
risk, there is no reason why Daniels should not be entitled to the 
protection of the recording act. Deseret certainly has not been 
duped or misled. 
C. EX PARTE ORDER INVALID TO DISCHARGE LIEN, BUT DOES 
INDICATE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF DESERET. 
Deseret points out at page 6, paragraph 11, of the 
Statement of Facts of its brief that on February 25, 1982, (the 
same day the action was filed) Judge Dee entered an ex parte order 
purporting to discharge Daniels' mechanic's lien upon the posting 
of a bond by plaintiff, CEN Corporation, with personal sureties. 
Counsel point out at paragraph 14 that this was approximately six 
days before Deseret recorded its Deed of Trust. 
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As Daniels1 action against the Deseret was dismissed on 
a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, discovery has 
never been conducted as to the actual knowledge of Deseret, but it 
appears very clear that Deseret did not want to loan against the 
property with the mechanic's lien outstanding, and accordingly CEN 
brought the instant action to try to nullify that lien and sought 
by an ex parte order to accomplish that. Having obtained the ex 
parte order, Deseret went ahead with the refinancing. It is 
difficult to believe that anyone could take Judge Dee's Order of 
February 25, 1982, seriously. There is no procedure in our law 
that allows a judge, by ex parte order, to nullify a mechanic's 
lien and substitute in its place a bond upon personal sureties, 
thereby substituting for the collateral of the land the personal 
guarantee of someone who may be in bankruptcy the next day. The 
whole notion is absurd, and the error was corrected. 
What no doubt really happened is that Deseret loaned 
against the property, and either the money to cover Jack Daniels' 
lien has been set aside in escrow by the owner or the title 
company has accepted indemnification by the owner, Deseret, or 
both, or a portion of the loan by Deseret has been set aside in 
escrow to indemnify against the outcome of this case. Those 
i 
probable facts will not be known for sure until discovery is 
undertaken. 
It nevertheless seems clear from the foregoing that 
( 
Deseret had not only constructive, but no doubt had actual notice 
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of the claims of Jack Danielsf and no doubt knew of the lawsuit 
which had been brought by CEN, and no doubt actually knew the 
substance of the claims of Jack Daniels. There is therefore no 
basis whatsoever to suppose that Deseret was not fully aware of 
the claims of Jack Daniels at the time it elected to loan on this 
project. 
D. DESERET HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE RISK. 
Deseret asserts a number of times in its brief that the 
purpose of the requirement for recording a mechanic's lien is to 
enable subsequent purchasers and mortgagees to "assess the risk." 
In this action Deseret took its interest nearly a month after the 
recording of the mechanic's lien, and if the purpose of actually 
recording the mechanic's lien is to allow subsequent purchasers 
and mortgagees to assess their risk, that has been fully 
accomplished in this action. When Deseret decided to loan on this 
project, it had constructive notice of Daniels' claim, could have 
made inquiry of him as to the nature of his claim, and as noted 
above was no doubt fully cognizant of Jack Daniels' position in 
actual fact. Having been advised of Daniels' mechanic's lien 
through constructive notice (and we believe discovery will reveal 
actual notice), Deseret was at liberty to proceed as it deemed 
advisable. If it felt Daniels' claim was invalid, it could take 
the risk of that belief. On the other hand, if Daniels is able to 
establish his claim in this proceeding, Deseret has not been hurt 
as it assumed the risk of that claim. 
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Deseret chose, with knowledge of Daniels' claim, to go 
forward with the transaction, and it has no doubt protected itself 
and stands to lose nothing in this matter. The only entity who 
will stand to lose anything in this transaction if the court 
upholds Daniels1 claim to an estoppel is the owner, and it is the 
owner who ought to be bound by the agreement which was made to pay 
Daniels, and the owner should not be allowed to escape the 
consequences of its conduct which resulted in the estoppel. 
E. ESTOPPEL WILL BE USELESS UNLESS SUBSEQUENT GRANTEES 
(MORTGATEES) ARE BOUND. 
If the court holds that the mechanic's lien is valid 
against the owner, but not against the subsequent mortgagee who 
takes with notice, the estoppel will be of no value whatever. The 
owner can misrepresent to the laborer that he will be paid if he 
will not timely file his lien and then, after the time has run, 
sell or mortgage the property (even to one having actual or 
constructive knowledge, or both) and do so with complete impunity, 
thereby nullifying the estoppel. The owner can then take its 
proceeds of the sale or loan, spend or hide them, and leave the 
laborer with no recourse, notwithstanding his attempt to cooperate 
with the owner to help the owner out in a difficult situation. The 
laborer should not be penalized for trying to assist the owner, at 
least where the subsequent mortgagee has notice of the claim. 
At page 28 of its brief Deseret sets forth the following 
quotation: 
-14-
"laws enacted for the protection of third persons 
should not be permitted to be waived since third persons 
interested in the statutes are not made party to the 
waiver." 
That quotation does not appear to be directed at a 
situation such as that present in this case. If Deseret had 
acquired its interest prior to the waiverf then the aforesaid 
quote would be applicable, and perhaps the owner would not be 
permitted to waive a statute which has already given a vested 
interest to a third party. In the instant casef however, the 
waiver took place long before Deseret acquired any interest in the 
property. Deseret is a grantee (mortgagee) of the very party 
whose conduct created the estoppel and as grantee (mortgagee) 
should not be permitted to acquire an interest superior to its 
grantor where it takes with notice of Daniels1 claim. 
F. ALIENABILITY UNAFFECTED. 
Deseret argues at page 27 of its brief that requiring 
Deseret to take subject to whatever Daniels is able to establish 
under its mechanic's lien will somehow be detrimental to the 
alienability of the real property. We do not think that requiring 
Deseret to assume the risk of the notice afforded by the recorded 
lien has anything to do with alienability. Any property which is 
subject to a mortgage, trust deed or other lien only has it 
alienability impaired if the owner expects a buyer to accept the 
property without the seller making provision for the lien. It is 
normally irrelevant to a buyer whether all of the purchase price 
goes to the owner or some of it goes to the owner and some of it 
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goes to the holder of the mortgage; it has nothing to do with 
alienability. Failure to hold Deseret to responsibility for 
whatever Daniels is able to establish for his lien will encourage 
fraud and discourage legitimate cooperation between owners of 
property and those who perform labor on it. What does society 
gain by a rule that would in effect prohibit a laborer from 
cooperating with the owner of property in terms of helping him out 
financially as it relates to a lender who takes with full notice 
of that situation as in the instant case. 
G. RULE OF BELTLINE BRICK CO. V. STANDARD HOME 
BUILDERS WILL NOT "EVISCERATE" UTAH LIEN STATUTE. 
Deseret appears to accept all of the authorities cited 
by Daniels in its brief under Point II with the exception of 
Beltline Brick Company v. Standard Home Builders, 213 NW 41 (Minn. 
1927). Deseret appears to concede that that case stands directly 
in favor of Daniels and against Deseret, and argues simply that to 
accept that case in Utah would "eviscerate" Utah mechanic's lien 
filing requirements. 
It should be noted that Minnesota had a filing deadline 
for mechanic's liens, and the whole point of the Beltline case is 
that under certain circumstances that deadline should not be 
enforceable against the laborer. The case in that state was not 
intended to "eviscerate" its filing requirements and certainly did 
not do so. It is a rule calculated to do justice in those 
circumstances where it is applicable. 
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The same is certainly true in the state of Utah. 
The application of that rule in this state is not going to 
"eviscerate" the filing requirement, but it will prohibit an owner 
or contractor from defrauding those it induces to rely upon its 
representations of payment, to their detriment. 
The trial court referred to the Beltline case as an 
"aberration." If it is an aberration, then we should have pointed 
out to us the numerous cases which stand for the opposite 
proposition, and that has not been done by Deseret, nor by the 
judge below. 
H. UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN V. MECHAM NOT APPLICABLE. 
At page 30 of its brief Deseret refers to the case of 
Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham, 12 Ut 2d 335, 366, P2d 598 (1961) 
as standing for the proposition that Deseret can only be charged 
with an estoppel if it participated in "some concealment, 
misrepresentation, act, or declaration" itself. The aforesaid 
quoted language from the Mecham case is entirely inapplicable to 
the instant fact situation. In the Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham 
case the issue was the priority between the holder of a 
construction mortgage and several mechanic's lien claimants. In 
that case the construction mortgage had priority over the 
mechanic's liens as it had been recorded before the holders of 
those liens commenced work. The holders of those liens, however, 
claimed that the lender (holder of the construction mortgage) was 
not obliged to advance the monies thereunder, and therefore that 
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they should have priority over any monies advanced by the lender 
after they commenced their work. The court held, however, that 
the lender was obliged to pay out the money in accordance with the 
directions of the borrower and that the holder of the construction 
mortgage would have priority to the extent of monies actually 
advanced unless the lender "is in someway estopped from asserting 
his priority." 
In that context the court goes on to say that a lender 
could be estopped through "some concealment, misrepresentation, 
act, or declaration by the mortgagee upon which the lienholder 
properly relied and by which he was induced to act differently 
than he otherwise would have acted." The court found no such 
estoppel in that case. The estoppel being considered in that case 
is entirely different from the estoppel which is the subject of 
the instant action. In Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham the 
construction lender had priority unless it gave that priority away 
through its misconduct. In the instant action Deseret never had 
priority as its title was subject to the estoppel from the moment 
it acquired an interest in the property. 
We feel that the care of In re Williamsen, 43 B.R. 813 
(U. S. Bankruptcy Court, D.Utah 1984) cited by Deseret is not in 
point. In that case Judge Clark ruled that certain mechanic's 
liens were null and void as lacking the "essential signature." 
The issue therefore was not whether the lien claimants had the 
right to file their liens after the statutory period by reason of 
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estoppel or otherwise, but rather the court found that the lien, 
though timely filed, lacked signature and was therefore void. The 
court went on to state that where the document is void on its 
face, it does not constitute notice. Judge Clark goes on and 
apparently holds that where the lien is invalid on its face as 
lacking a proper signature, it does not constitute constructive 
notice, and "actual notice" thereof does not revive a void lien. 
Judge Clark seems to hold that a subsequent encumbrancer (even if 
he checks the record and sees that a mechanic's lien has been 
filed which is void on its face) is entitled to proceed as though 
the lien did not exist. Judge Clark seems to feel that as the 
lien never existed, there was nothing about which a subsequent 
encumbrancer could have actual knowledge. 
In the instant case, however, the lien filed by Daniels 
was not void on its face, and it is Daniels' position that Deseret 
was not entitled to ignore the lien and is charged with whatever 
Daniels is able to establish thereunder. 
At page 824 of the decision in In re Williamsen the 
court discusses the fact that the debtor "completed, acknowledged 
and notarized" the liens and that the claimants had asserted that 
because the owner had prepared the liens, and the errors in the 
preparation were his and not the claimants', the claimant should 
not be charged with those errors. The court characterized that 
argument as an "estoppel" argument, although the court noted that 
the claimaints had not so characterized that argument. The court 
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went on to point out that the "estoppel" argument might be 
persuasive if the debtor were attacking the liens, but that since 
the person attacking the liens was another creditor, the argument 
lacked persuasion. No details of the relationship between the 
debtor and that particular creditor are given in the opinion. 
The court in discussing the "estoppel" argument refers 
to Baqqs v. Anderson. 528 P2d 141 (Utah 1974) and Rayner v. H. 
Line Transport Inc., 15 Ut 2d 427, 394 P2d 383 (1964), both of 
which cases involved conduct (constituting the alleged estoppel) 
which was that of a person or entity not in privity with the 
person sought to be estopped. In the Baqqs case the statement by 
a stepfather was held not to be binding on the natural mother, and 
in the H. Line case a statement by the insurance carrier to 
another insurance company regarding subrogation was held not to be 
binding upon the insured in an action brought by the insured. 
It seems clear that Judge Clark in citing Baqqs v. H. 
Line did not consider estoppel from the standpoint of privity, and 
we respectfully submit that the Williamsen case is thus 
distinguishable from the instant case. It is of course in any 
event for the Utah Supreme Court to declare the substantive law of 
Utah and not for the federal courts. 
I. NO REQUIREMENT THAT LIEN USE THE WORD "ESTOPPEL." 
At page 25 of its brief Deseret points out in Note 4 
that the mechanic's lien as recorded by Daniels did not refer to 
I 
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the fact of estoppel by its terms. Even though the lien may not 
use the word, "estoppel," Deseret does not contend that had 
Daniels used that word that Deseret would have taken subject to 
the lien. It appears rather to be Deseret's position that it 
could ignore the lien whether it used the word "estoppel" or not. 
Certainly the absence or presence of the word "estoppel" is not 
determinative in this case. Deseret, having acquired its interest 
with knowledge of the lien, must take subject to whatever Daniels 
can establish for the lien. There is certainly no showing that 
the conduct of Deseret was or would have been affected one way or 
the other by the presence or absence of the word "estoppel," but 
that of course is a factual matter in any event, and appellant is 
entitled to discovery on that point and (if it is indeed an issue) 
to have the matter considered by the factfinder. It would not be 
a proper matter for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that 
the summary judgment of the lower court be reversed and that this 
case be remanded for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted: 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Telephone: (801) 363-8077 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-*B° 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK C. DANIELS, DEBRA 
ESTES, SCOTT BERRY, DEBRA 
ANN SITZBERGER, and AMY 
STANTON EAGLESON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DISCHARGING 
CLAIMS 
Civil No. <^o 
Upon the motion of plaintiff and upon consideration of the verified complaint of 
plaintiff, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the recorded claims of the defendants as decribed in 
plaintiff's complaint are hereby released from real property of plaintiff, and shall 
have no effect as a lien or interest whatsoever upon said real property, more 
particularly described as follows: 
All of Lots 8, 9, & 10, and the South 1/2 of Lots 11 <5c 22, and all of 
Lots 23, 24 & 25, Block 4 SNYDERS ADDITION to Park City, 
according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the 
Summit County Recorder's Office. 
upon the posting of bond in the amount of $75,000. 
In that plaintiff has alleged that it will suffer inseparable harm as a result of its 
' inability to close financing as a result of said claims, this order is granted ex parte. 
' , Dated: February 29^, 1982 at ftfy»An_. 
U By the Court: 
A b U V j » t i w j T 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
f%mm*>*+ —•"•— 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants. ' 
) ORDER 
Civil No. 6790 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 
21stday of June 1982 before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
judge of the above-entitled court, on the Motion of plaintiff, 
for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff appeared by and through 
its attorney, Keith W. Meade, and the defendant, Jack C. Daniels, 
appeared by and through his attorneys, Gordon A. Madsen and 
Robert C. Cummings, and the Court, having heard the arguments 
of counsel and having taken the matter under advisement; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff1s said Motion for Summary Judgment 
is denied. 
2. Any Lis Pendens filed in connection with this 
matter should be, and is, vacated and canceled. 
DATED t h i s
 / ^ dc-j o f J i # * ^ 1 9 8 2 , 
BY THE 
# - 1 2 0 
Telephone 322-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JftCK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants, 
AMENDED ORDER 
Civil No. 6790 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 
21st day of June 1982 before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
judge of the above-entitled court, on the Motion of plaintiff 
for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff appeared by and through 
its attorney, Keith W. Meade, and defendant, Jack C. Daniels, 
appeared by and through his attorneys, Gordon A. Madsen and 
Robert C. Cummings, and the Court, having heard the arguments 
of counsel and having taken the matter under advisement; 
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, but any 
Lis Pendens should be and is vacated and cancelled. 
2. Lien not pancelled or vacated. 
i-'d-A DATED this /, day ot'Zr^'^^^-f^y , 1983 
Keith. W. Meade ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
Telephone: (801> 3Sa-^46&- •-
IN THE THIBD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT POR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH
 N 
MICHAEL McCOY, d/b/a, 
PARK AVENUE DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah joint 
venture, 
Plaintiff, : AMENDED COMPLAINT 
-vs-» 
JACK C» DANIELS, d/b/a : 
J.O. CONSTUCTION, DELTA " Civil No, C 82 4628 
FIRE SYSTEMS, INC*, a Utah. \ 
Plaintiff, for causa of action* alleges as follows r 
THE PARTIES 
1. Defendant Jack C. Daniels, hereinafter "Daniels", is 
a resident of Salt Lake County. 
2. Plaintiff has acquired all of the interest of Park 
is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. Defendant Eaton Electric has its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Defendant Eugene A. Kynaston, d/b/a Mid Valley Roofing, 
Co., hereinafter "kynaston", is a resident of Salt Lake County. ^ 
THE PACTS 
6. On or aibout August 24, 19.80, Daniels agreed, inter alia, 
Note: This pleading referred to at page 9 of Supplemental Memorandum 
of Daniels (R 134) . Not yet introduced in evidence 
as case disposed of on Motion to Dismiss. 
to: 
a. construct a condominium in Park City, Utah 
on behalf of Park Avenue Development; (.contract 
attached as exhibit "A"} . 
b. .supply quality labor and materials for the 
construction of the condominium; 
c. provide said materials' and perform said work 
to the satisfaction of plaintiff; 
d. exercise control over disbursements from the 
•construction loan; and 
e* obtain the lowest bids for subcontracted work 
and materials which would preserve the quality 
of the project. 
7. Daniels entered into a subcontract with. Delta Fire * 
Systems, Inc.., whereby Delta would install fire sprinkler equip-
ment in the condominium. 
3. Daniels entered into a subcontract with Eaton Electric 
install all of the electrical wiring: in. the condominium. 
9. Daniels entered into a subcontract with Mid-Valley 
Roofing Company to install the roof on the condominium. ' 
10. The construction was, completed in June 1981, and subsequent 
to the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy in July, 1981, the 
following material defects have been discovered: 
a^ jfcjie roof leaks ixLsasmml locations:. _ 
b. electrical wiring was net. completed in several 
of the units in the condominium; 
, c. the sprinkler systems were not properly installed 
and froze and burst as a result; 
d. the outdoor hot tub was not adequate to- perform 
in cold weather. 
11. Plaintiff substantially performed its obligations pursuant 
to the contract. 
FTHS7 CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs one through 
13. Defendants, including "Daniels'*, impliedly warranted 
that the condominium would be erected in /a workmanlike manne 
and in accordance with good usage and accepted practices in the 
community. 
14 . Defendants have breached their warranty with respect 
* • » ' '" i • i i i n . i, i, ,uimu ,n, . L y ,. i , i , i III i' mm 
to the items s e t fort&JJL^^fl^aph e^TT above, ,jcjkusing p l a i n t i f f 
to suffer damages to- property and l o s s of income from r e n t a l s . 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
15. Plaintiff incorporates^ herein paragraphs one through, 
eleven. 
16. Defendants owed plaintiff a duty to perform the contract 
in a workmanlike and complete manner. 
17. Defendants breached said duty as set: forth in paragraph 
ten hereinabove. 
13. As a. proximate result of said breach, plaintiff has 
suffered damage to property and loss of income from, rentals.. 
THZSO. CAUSE: OF ACTION 
19. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs one through 
eleven. 
2Q. Defendant "Daniels* contracted to provide all the materials 
and perform all work described in the approved drawings and 
specifications to the satisfaction of plaintiff. 
21. Defendant "Daniels" and the other defendants as sub— 
contractors under Daniels control failed ta provide said materials 
and perform said work to plaintiff's reasonable satisfaction as 
set forth in paragraph 10 above. 
22. Defendants have breached their contracts with respect to 
the terms set forth in paragraph ten above. 
23. Plaintiff has been damaged by defendants' breach of 
contract, including damage to property and Loss of income from 
rentals. 
FOURTH GAUSS: or ACTIO:: 
. 24 • 'Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs one through 
ileven. 
22. Plaintiff relied upon Daniel's superior knowledge in 
instruction matters *r*g granted him control over all construction 
iisbursements« 
26. Daniels owed plaintiff a contractual *ai, fiduciary duty 
-o complete the project using the most cost efficient sources 
without affecting quality. 
2?. Daniels breached this duty in that he fariled to acquire 
competitive bids. for various aspects of the project, and made 
payments to subcontractors in' excess of the fair value of their 
services. 
2S. As a result of said breech, plaintiff has suffered 
damage in an amount unknown to it, but known to Daniels, as measured 
by -excessive .payments for services and materials 
WBEBEFOSE, plaintiff prays for relief «s follows.: 
1. That Daniels account to plaintiff for all disbursements 
made; 
2. That plaintiff be awarded damages in an' amount to be 
shown at trial, resulting from the .conduct alleged herein, which 
amount plaintiff believes to be not less than $100,000; 
3. That plaintiff be awarded its costs, attorney's fees, 
and such other and further relief as is just in the premises. 
DATED this • day of September, 1982. 
Keith w. tteade 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
RENON ANDERSON _, being duly sworn, says: 
That he/she is employed in the offices of BROWN & BROWN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff '_ . 
herein 
that he/she served the attached Amended Complaint 
upon 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to L. Rich Humphreys, Esq. Kearns Building, Suite $900, SLC 34101 
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq., 320 South* 300 East, SLC, Utah 34010 
Kenneth H. Kisatake, Esq. 
1825 South 700 East 
SLC, Utah 3 4 015 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
th^deon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
^ a y of , 198? 
tneijec 
<u^^ *ON ANDERSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
_ , 198 . 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
/ 
/ 
